The shores of the Gulf

THE CLASH of Iranian demonstrators in Mecca with Saudi security forces vividly evokes the worst nightmares of the conservative Sunni leaders of the Persian Gulf. The conservative Gulf states have long believed that the real threat to Persian Gulf security was Shiite fundamentalism, not Silkworm missiles; Iranian martyrs, not Iranian mines.

Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates all contain large Shiite minorities subject to influence from Iran. Iraq's Shiites have remained loyal to their own country during the seven-year war with Iran, despite their religious leaning toward the Ayatollah. Whether that loyalty could withstand the test of a smashing Iranian victory, however, is doubtful. In Islam, military victory is a sign of God's blessing.

Provided Congress does not pass some silly amendment (Boland II?) restricting U.S. naval activities in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy should have sufficient power to ensure freedom of navigation in that vital waterway--even with the refusal by our European allies (whom, along with Japan, the oil transported from the Gulf mainly benefits) to send minesweepers there. Control of the waterway will not mean much, however, if the shoreline falls uniformly under the control of radical anti-American regimes ruled by fanatics, religious or otherwise. Such a scenario would send Soviet strategists on a troublemaking shopping spree that could ultimately result in Western oil supplies falling under the control of Soviet client regimes, or in Soviet naval and air bases being established along the Persian Gulf, or in both.

In short, while all eyes are on the interesting naval proceedings in the Persian Gulf, let us not forget that the world's largest and most mobile army has divisions stationed only a few hundred miles to the north. This is one factor in the Persian Gulf equation the United States cannot afford to ignore.

COPYRIGHT 1987 National Review, Inc.
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group